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Police and National Security: American Local Law 
Enforcement and Counterterrorism After 9/11 
Matthew C. Waxman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks inside the United States, 
local police agencies have taken on greater national security roles and 
responsibilities. “The September 11 attacks,” wrote Attorney General John 
Ashcroft to all U.S. Attorneys in November 2001, “demonstrate that the 
war on terrorism must be fought and won at home as well as abroad”: 
 
To meet this new threat and to prevent future attacks, 
law enforcement officials at all levels of government – 
federal, state, and local – must work together, sharing 
information and resources needed both to arrest and 
prosecute the individuals responsible and to detect and 
destroy terrorist cells before they can strike again.1 
 
President Obama’s Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, 
recently testified that the budget request from the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) included additional counterterrorism funding for “systems 
to enhance information-sharing among federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement.”2  Elsewhere Napolitano characterized partnerships with state, 
local, and tribal authorities as one of the priorities of the DHS and noted 
that “[p]artnerships with state, local, tribal, and territorial agencies affect 
DHS’s ability to identify threats and bolster preparedness before an 
incident,” and that “[i]nformation sharing between DHS and state and local 




 * Associate Professor, Columbia Law School; Member of the Hoover Institution 
Task Force on National Security and Law; Adjunct Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign 
Relations.  I thank the following individuals for their helpful comments: William C. Banks, 
David Bayley, Ben Bowling, David Cole, Jeffrey Fagan, Aziz Huq, Debra Livingston, 
Samuel Rascoff, Daniel Richman, Jacqueline Ross, and Peter Schuck. 
 1. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to All U.S. Att’ys, Cooperation 
with State and Local Officials in the Fight Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/agdirective5.pdf. 
 2. FY 2010 Budget Request: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th 
Cong. (2009) (oral testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dept. of Homeland Sec.), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1242307132502.shtm. 
 3. The Path Forward: Hearing on DHS Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 
111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of the Dept. of Homeland Sec.), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/testimony/testimony_1235577134817.shtm. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305268
378            JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 3:377 
This article examines three national security law challenges resulting 
from greater involvement of state and local police agencies in protecting 
national security, especially in combating terrorism: organizational 
challenges, accountability challenges, and institutional tensions with 
traditional local police functions.  Each threatens the balance of security 
and civil liberties. 
This article concludes by forecasting that these three challenges will be 
addressed incrementally over time, depending on such factors as the 
continuing evolution of the terrorism threat.  Aside from its specific 
observations, a broader point of this article is that the overwhelming 
scholarly attention focused on federal national security law issues misses 
the practical consequences of legal debates that often play out at a local 
level in very different ways. 
Part II examines organizational challenges, in particular how the 
decentralized and localized nature of American policing creates enormous 
problems in coordinating national security and counterterrorism activities. 
Local police agencies offer tremendous resources in terms of personnel and 
the familiarity needed to prevent, investigate, and respond to terrorism.  But 
the atomization of U.S. policing requires new coordination mechanisms to 
harness these resources effectively in pursuit of a national agenda. In recent 
years the federal government and the states have launched many initiatives 
aimed at integrating the thousands of U.S. law enforcement agencies, which 
vary widely in size, capability, threat perception, and relationship to local 
communities. 
Part III examines accountability challenges, including secrecy issues 
and how the counterterrorism agenda may influence or disrupt systems of 
political accountability of local police agencies.  Those systems are 
designed for traditional police functions like preventing crime and 
maintaining order, the costs and benefits of which are generally felt locally 
and discerned visibly by the public.  By contrast, some national security 
functions are necessarily shielded from public view, and the benefits of 
local police efforts in support of national security accrue elsewhere or are 
unobservable. 
Part IV examines functional challenges, especially how some of the 
attributes that make local policing a useful counterterrorism tool also create 
difficulties in simultaneously carrying out more traditional functions.  A 
tension that sometimes exists between law enforcement and intelligence 
activities is exacerbated when stretched across local-federal lines, and some 
actions that may be important to national security can be highly disruptive 
to traditional law and order police efforts within local communities.  
Finally, Part V offers some general observations about alternative 
futures and the opportunities for addressing the challenges outlined here. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305268
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I.  AMERICAN POLICING AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
BEFORE AND AFTER SEPTEMBER 11 
The subject of police and national security in the United States often 
conjures fears of aggressive snooping and overbroad sweeps of political 
dissidents. In the years following World War I, a period now remembered 
for overblown alarm about radical leftist activity, J. Edgar Hoover’s Bureau 
of Investigation (the forerunner of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or 
FBI) enlisted local police agencies to conduct a series of raids – called the 
“Palmer Raids” for Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer – on suspected 
radicals.4  On two occasions – in November 1919 and January 1920 – the 
government violently seized thousands of immigrants across the United 
States without arrest warrants and targeted them for deportation based on 
suspicion that they held radical political beliefs. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, the FBI requested local police agencies’ 
assistance in its “Counter-Intelligence Program” (COINTELPRO), aimed at 
allegedly subversive political groups, eventually including wide swaths of 
the civil rights movement membership.5 
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, local police again 
mobilized in support of nationwide efforts to combat national security 
threats, this time jihadist terrorism.  Some observers see this as a necessary 
precaution; others see parallels to past law enforcement abuses.6  Both 
views were displayed, for instance, when the New York City Police 
Department (NYPD) prepared for the 2004 Republican National 
Convention by deploying undercover officers across the country to conduct 
covert surveillance of suspected protesters, including members of religious 
groups and anti-war organizations. 
David Cohen, a former deputy director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and now Deputy New York City Policy Commissioner for 
Intelligence, proclaimed that “[g]iven the range of activities that may be 
engaged in by the members of a sleeper cell in the long period of 
 
 4. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 220-226 (2004).  For a discussion of the 
violent nature of the government raids, see CHRISTOPHER M. FINAN, FROM THE PALMER 
RAIDS TO THE PATRIOT ACT: A HISTORY OF THE FIGHT FOR FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 1-4 
(2007) (“During the first raid in November 1919, the police arrested over 1,000 people in 
eleven cities, sometimes bursting into their homes and dragging them out of their beds 
without explanation.  Many of those who were ultimately detained were denied access to an 
attorney and kept ignorant of the charges against them.” ; “Over 3,000 members of the 
Communist and Communist Labor parties were seized during a second, even larger raid in 
January 1920.”) . 
 5. See DAVID CUNNINGHAM, THERE’S SOMETHING HAPPENING HERE: THE NEW LEFT, 
THE KLAN, AND FBI COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (2004); see also RICHARD E. MORGAN, 
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE: MONITORING DISSENT IN AMERICA (1980). 
 6. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, THE ENEMY WITHIN: INTELLIGENCE GATHERING, 
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE WAKE OF SEPTEMBER 11 63 (2002). 
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preparation for an act of terror, the entire resources of the NYPD must be 
available to conduct investigations into political activity and intelligence-
related issues.”7 Civil liberties groups expressed outrage and brought suits 
against the city alleging widespread rights abuses and political harassment.8 
This tension between civil liberties and state security measures lies at 
the heart of national security law.  By “national security law,” I mean 
regulation of coercive government powers wielded to protect the state, 
including against external military threats as well as internal efforts to 
undermine government.  While there are some particular features that 
pertain to local policing, the substantive issue of balancing investigatory 
and coercive state powers against rights and freedoms is certainly not 
unique to local police, nor is it unique to U.S. policing. 
What makes the issue of U.S. policing and national security so 
interesting and complex is the decentralized and localized nature of most 
law enforcement in this country.9  A recent National Research Council 
study estimates that there are about 13,500 local police departments across 
the country.10  Another source puts the number of state and local police 
agencies closer to 19,000.11 
Sub-federal police agencies include state, county, city, or town, and 
tribal organizations.  These sub-federal agencies are responsible for the vast 
bulk of crime fighting and community protection in this country, and they 
are as heterogeneous and geographically dispersed as the local populations 
they serve. 
Terrorism was by no means a new problem for the United States in 
2001, nor were state and local governments uninvolved in the 
counterterrorism effort before then.  The 1990s alone saw the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the series of 
attacks by “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski. 
 
 7. Jim Dwyer, City Police Spied Broadly Before G.O.P. Convention, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 25, 2007, at A1. 
 8. See Diane Cardwell, Lawyers’ Group Sues City over Arrests of Protesters, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2004, at B3. 
 9. HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 131-136 (1977); James Q. Wilson, 
Criminal Justice, in UNDERSTANDING AMERICA: THE ANATOMY OF AN EXCEPTIONAL NATION 
475, 475 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008). 
        10.  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: 
THE EVIDENCE 49 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004).  The Department of Justice 
recently provided the following numbers: 12,766 local police departments and 3,067 
sheriffs’ offices. Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Census of State and Local 
Law Enforcement Agencies, 2004 at 1 (Carolyn C. Williams ed.) (2007), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/csllea04.htm. 
 11. James X. Dempsey, Overview of Current Criminal Justice Systems, in COMPUTERS, 
FREEDOM AND PRIVACY 101 (2000), available at http://www.cdt.org/publications/overview 
ofcjis.pdf. 
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Many states in the 1990s enacted criminal statutes against terrorist 
activity that mirror federal criminal laws.12  Until the September 11 attacks, 
however, terrorism within the United States was not a priority issue at any 
level of government.  Terrorism fell largely within the jurisdiction of the 
FBI, and even there it was generally of secondary importance to fighting 
federal crimes such as white-collar and narcotics offenses.13 
Following the 1993 World Trade Center attack, FBI Director Louis 
Freeh tried to reorient the Bureau’s priorities toward counterterrorism, 
including through the creation of a counterterrorism division, but his efforts 
failed to alter significantly the agency’s dominant focus on investigating 
and solving other federal crimes.14 
Meanwhile, one survey in the mid-1990s found that less than 40 
percent of state law enforcement agencies and only about half of local 
police agencies had contingency plans for dealing with terrorist threats.  
About 40 percent of municipalities reported never having had contact with 
federal agencies regarding terrorism issues.15 
The September 2001 attacks, followed soon after by anthrax attacks in 
the postal system, generated new urgency in counterterrorism efforts and 
stimulated information-sharing throughout the U.S. government system.  
Changed threat perceptions also resulted in major federal and state 
bureaucratic restructuring. 
At the federal level this mobilization included vastly increasing the 
FBI’s emphasis on domestic counterterrorism through structural changes 
and increasing the personnel dedicated to this mission.16  Congress created 
the new Department of Homeland Security, which consolidated nearly two 
dozen federal agencies and assumed responsibility for protecting U.S. 
territory from terrorist attacks and responding to natural disasters.17  Perhaps 
most controversially, even the Department of Defense expanded its efforts 
to identify suspected terrorists and other threats within the United States, 
until civil liberties objections prompted curtailment.18 
 
 12. See Laura K. Donohue & Juliette N. Kayyem, Federalism and the Battle over 
Counterterrorist Law: State Sovereignty, Criminal Law Enforcement, and National Security, 
25 STUD. IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1 (2002). 
 13. See NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT 74 (2004). 
 14. See id. at 76-78. 
 15. KEVIN JACK RILEY & BRUCE R. HOFFMAN, DOMESTIC TERRORISM: A NATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL PREPAREDNESS 26, 31 (1995). 
 16. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE FBI: A CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1908-2008, 
at 98-106, available at http://www.fbi.gov/book.htm; Progress Report on the 
Reorganization and Refocus of the FBI: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Dep’ts. of 
Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary and Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on 
Appropriations, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, Dir., FBI), 
available at http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress03/mueller061803.htm. 
      17.     Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §101, 116 Stat. 2142. 
 18. In 2002, the Counterintelligence Field Activity Office (CIFA) was created within 
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At the local level, too, governments shifted emphasis to preventing and 
preparing for potential terrorist attacks.19  It was not just the magnitude of 
the perceived terrorist threat after September 11 that pushed the 
counterterrorism agenda down to local levels of government, including to 
within the police agencies; it was also the sense that major national 
vulnerabilities once again existed at home, with threats materializing or 
operating inside U.S. borders.  The September 11 attacks left the 
government at all levels – federal, state and local – worried about gaps in 
their capabilities to piece together and neutralize terrorist plots.  Many of 
the “dots” comprising the September 11 plot sequence occurred within the 
United States, including flight instruction by several of the eventual 
hijackers and traffic violation stops of two of them by state police.  Perhaps, 
it followed, the attacks could have been averted with better systems and 
policies to discern, analyze, and act on such “dots” throughout the country, 
ultimately uncovering the plot.20 
The September 11 attacks also created a national sense of fear that al 
Qaeda and its allies were in the process of unleashing a campaign of 
additional attacks using “sleeper cells” embedded in American 
communities, and awaiting orders or opportunities to strike.21  A number of 
 
the Department of Defense to better coordinate the Pentagon’s efforts to combat foreign 
intelligence services and terrorism groups inside the United States.  The Talon database, 
maintained in CIFA and begun in 2003, was designed to house intelligence reports about 
possible threats to military bases within the United States, but was “expanded to include 
reports by local law enforcement agencies and military security personnel about nonviolent 
demonstrations and rallies.” Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Intelligence Chief Proposes Ending a 
Database, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2007, at A18.  Reports later surfaced that the database 
included information about antiwar protests at churches, schools, and Quaker meeting halls.  
Eric Lichtblau & Mark Mazzetti, Military Documents Hold Tips on Antiwar Activities, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A18; Mark Mazzetti, Pentagon Is Expected To Close Intelligence  
Unit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2008, at A24; see also Walter Pincus, Protesters Found in 
Database: ACLU Is Questioning Entries in Defense Dept. System, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 
2007, at A8.  Defense officials stated that those operating the Talon database had 
“misinterpreted their mandate” in collecting such information.  See Lichtblau & Mazzetti, 
supra.  CIFA was also tied to “national security letters” issued by the Pentagon to American 
banks for the purpose of obtaining information about terrorism suspects. Mark Mazzetti, 
Cheney Defends Efforts To Obtain Financial Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2007, at A10.  
The Department of Defense closed Talon in September 2007. Press Release, Dep’t of Def., 
DoD To Implement Interim Threat Reporting Procedures (Aug. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11251, and CIFA in August  
2008.  Press Release, Dep’t of Def., DoD Activates Defense Counterintelligence and Human 
Intelligence Center (Aug. 4, 2008), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/ 
release.aspx?releaseid=12106. 
 19. See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, POST 9-11 POLICING: THE 
CRIME CONTROL-HOMELAND SECURITY PARADIGM 1 (2005); Patrick S. Roberts, Shifting 
Priorities: Congressional Incentives and the Homeland Security Granting Process, 22 REV. 
POL’Y RES. 437 (2005); Karen Tumulty, But Will We Be Any Safer?, TIME, Dec. 2, 2002, at 
42. 
 20. See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13, at 215-241, 416-418. 
 21. See Kevin Whitelaw & Mark Mazzetti, War in the Shadows, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, Nov. 11, 2002, at 48. 
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alleged al Qaeda cells in the United States have been arrested and 
prosecuted in the years since the September 11 attacks, including the 
“Lackawanna 6” (a half-dozen Yemeni-Americans living near Buffalo, 
New York, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda)22 and a 
Miami-based group allegedly bent on destroying Chicago’s Sears Tower.23  
Most recently, federal agencies arrested and charged Najibullah Zazi, an 
Afghan immigrant who allegedly trained in an al Qaeda camp in Pakistan 
and planned to detonate bombs within the United States.24 
In retrospect, the sophistication and potential effectiveness of many of 
the thwarted cells has been called into doubt, and the partial disruption of al 
Qaeda’s leadership apparatus in Afghanistan and Pakistan has sewn doubt 
as to whether al Qaeda still poses a major threat of attack inside the United 
States.25  But the reduced worry of centrally commanded or supported al 
Qaeda cells inside the United States has been replaced by additional 
concerns about locally rooted, organizationally autonomous radical 
extremists who might plan and carry out terrorist attacks in the name of a 
broader al Qaeda-inspired agenda.26 
As a result of these emerging threats, local police agencies have played 
a number of expanded counterterrorism roles in recent years.27  These 
 
 22. See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (2005). 
 23. Damien Cave & Carmen Gentile, Five Convicted in Plot To Blow up Sears Tower 
as Part of Islamic Jihad, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2009, at A19. 
 24. See David Johnston & Scott Shane, Terror Case: 'Scary' Ingredients, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 25, 2009, at A1. 
 25. See discussion below in Part V.  A recent U.S. intelligence assessment did not rule 
out the possibility of major al Qaeda attacks inside the United States.  DENNIS C. BLAIR, 
ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FOR THE SENATE SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 6 (2009), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/090212/ 
blair.pdf (“We lack insight into specific details, timing, and intended targets of potential, 
current US Homeland plots, although we assess al-Qa’ida continues to pursue plans for 
Homeland attacks . . .”); Walter Pincus, Counterterrorism Official Urges Broader Approach 
to Foreign Policy, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2009, at A21; see also Johnston & Shane, supra 
note 24, (“In recent years, foiled plots announced with fanfare in Washington have 
sometimes involved unsophisticated people who seem hardly capable of organizing a major 
attack.”). 
 26. See BLAIR, supra note 25, at 7: 
[W]e remain concerned about the potential for homegrown extremists inspired by 
al-Qa’ida’s militant ideology to plan attacks inside the United Sates, Europe and 
elsewhere without operational direction from the group itself.  In this regard, over 
the next year we will remain focused on identifying any ties between US-based 
individuals and extremist networks overseas.  Though difficult to measure, the 
spread of radical Salafi Internet sites that provide religious justification for attacks; 
aggressive and violent anti-Western rhetoric; and signs that self-generating cells in 
the US identify with Bin Ladin’s violent objectives all point to the likelihood that a 
small but violent number of cells may develop here. 
 27. See David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration 
Enforcement: A Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 3 
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include criminal law enforcement, public protection, emergency response, 
and intelligence gathering. 
Most criminal prosecutions for crimes directly related to terrorism are 
investigated and prosecuted at the federal level.28  Federal investigative and 
prosecutorial capabilities are vast and sophisticated, while federal 
antiterrorism statutes and the high profile of such crimes push the 
prosecution of terrorism crimes at the federal rather than state and local 
levels.  However, local police agencies’ efforts to prevent and deter crime 
also aim to establish an environment inhospitable to terrorism-related 
activities – a role that many local forces have internalized since 2001.29 
Besides these law enforcement roles, local police agencies’ 
responsibilities for providing protection of possible target sites, public 
education and awareness, and emergency response have grown 
considerably.30 An extensive survey in 2002 by the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors details the significant financial and personnel costs of these efforts 
at the municipal level, especially within local police departments.31  A 2005 
survey of state and local police agencies by the International Association of 
 
(2006).  A 2005 RAND survey of state and local law enforcement agencies found, not 
surprisingly, that counterterrorism activities have tended to be concentrated especially in 
larger police departments: “[T]he survey findings, which reflect heightened awareness 
associated with the Oklahoma City and September 11 attacks, suggest that the ‘eyes and 
ears’ capability is concentrated among the larger departments.  These are the agencies 
investing in training, response plans, coordination, and other preparedness measures.” K. 
JACK RILEY ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 27 (2005), 
available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG394/. 
 28. See N.Y.U. CTR. ON LAW & SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD (Karen J. 
Greenberg ed., 2006), available at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/publications/TTRC 
Complete.pdf. 
 29. See George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Policing Terrorism, Civic Bulletin 
No. 43 (Manhattan Inst. Ctr. for Civic Innovation, New York, N.Y.), Sept. 2006, at 1, 
available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/cb_43.htm; see also Michael P. 
Downing, Policing Terrorism in the United States: The Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Convergence Strategy, POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 2009,  available at http://policechief 
magazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display&article_id=1729&issue_id=22009: 
Policing must be a convergent strategy that fights crime and disorder while 
creating hostile environments for terrorists. 
The theme of convergence illustrates the coupling of local resources, namely 
police, with the ability to recognize ordinary crimes that terrorists have been 
known to commit in preparation for their operational attack: committing traffic 
violations, obtaining fake identification papers, smuggling, human trafficking, 
counterfeiting, committing piracy, drug trafficking, or participating in any other 
criminal enterprise that intersects with terrorists’ needs.  Local police serve as the 
eyes and ears of communities; as such, they are best positioned to observe 
behaviors that have a nexus to terrorism. 
 30. See Nomination Hearing for Napolitano Before the S. Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs Comm., 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Janet Napolitano, Sec’y-
Designate of the Dept. of Homeland Sec.), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/ 
testimony/testimony_1232547062602.shtm; Harris, supra note 27, at 10-12. 
 31. U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, THE COST OF HEIGHTENED SECURITY IN AMERICA’S CITIES: 
A 192-CITY SURVEY (2002). 
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Chiefs of Police further documents significant changes in operational 
capacity, mission focus, and program resourcing.32 
Perhaps the most important as well as controversial national security 
role for police, however, is intelligence collection.33 Following exposure of 
abusive law enforcement surveillance tactics during the 1950s to 1970s, 
many police agencies dismantled their intelligence collection units 
altogether.34  After September 11, many of these agencies scrambled to 
reconstitute or expand their intelligence units, though research data on the 
extent of this transformation remains slim.35 “It was often the feeling at 
local law enforcement prior to 9/11 that intelligence gathering was a 
Federal responsibility,” noted Miami Police Chief John F. Timoney in 2006 
congressional testimony. “[B]ut the events in Madrid and London and some 
events recently here in the United States are highlights that local law 
enforcement can have a very important role.”36  Many police agencies 
created intelligence analyst positions and assembled new units dedicated to 
countering terrorism.37 The difficult organizational, accountability and 
functional challenges this role creates for the nationwide policing system 
are explored in the next three Parts. 
II.  ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES 
Intelligence, investigation, deterrence, site protection, public education, 
and emergency response are not new concerns for local police agencies.38 
Indeed, having long held responsibility for all of these functions to certain 
degrees, local police were already well suited to perform these antiterrorism 
activities. But harnessing police agencies for a national security agenda 
creates difficult organizational challenges, magnified by the resilience of 
U.S. policing’s decentralization and heterogeneity. 
 
 32. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 19, at 23-32. 
 33. Of course, intelligence – including the use of informants, undercover officers, and 
electronic surveillance – is part of routine police crime prevention as well.  The line between 
such activities and national security intelligence is not a bright one, though the latter may be 
better hidden from public view and has proven more likely to intrude on political and 
religious activities.  See Jacqueline E. Ross, The Place of Covert Surveillance in Democratic 
Societies: A Comparative Study of the United States and Germany, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 
533, 566-568 (2007). 
 34. Edward R. Maguire & William R. King, Trends in the Policing Industry, 593 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15 (2004). 
 35. See id. 
 36. Police as First Preventers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Prevention of 
Nuclear and Biological Attack of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. (2006) 
(statement of John F. Timoney, Chief of Police, Miami, Fla.) 
 37. See Maguire & King, supra note 34. 
 38. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. 
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It is natural that local police agencies would be called upon to combat 
the terrorism threat after September 11.  The public looks first to local 
police for basic security.  Furthermore, the federal government had little 
choice but to seek and cultivate the assistance of local police because these 
agencies possess the numbers of personnel needed to sustain these functions 
over vast territory and for long periods of time.  According to recent data, 
state and local law enforcement agencies employed about 730,000 full-time 
sworn officers, defined as those with general arrest powers,39 compared with 
the FBI’s roughly 13,000 special agents.40  The New York City Police 
Department’s counterterrorism division alone (by far the largest municipal-
level counterterrorism force) has about 1,000 dedicated officers,41 while the 
entire FBI dedicates only about one-and-a-half times that number of special 
agents to combating terrorism.42 
Aside from this numerical advantage, local police are often believed to 
be better suited to perform counterterrorism functions because of their 
superior familiarity with their local communities.43  Whereas federal law 
enforcement officials are tasked with investigating specific federal crimes, 
local police functions include preventing and investigating crime as well as 
maintaining order, patrolling, and providing services.  As a result of these 
wider mandates, local police are positioned naturally to collect and process 
information about communities and activities within them. 
Modern policing strategy trends, including community policing and 
problem-oriented policing, also call for wide and deep engagement within 
the community.44  These responses to crime, disorder, and other community 
problems require fostering both proactive and reactive relationships with 
local social agencies, civic leaders, and community organizations, as well 
as developing deep awareness of community environments.45  Armed with 
 
 39.  Reaves, supra note 10. 
 40. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Quick Facts, http://www.fbi.gov/quickfacts.htm.  
See also Judith Miller, On the Front Line in the War on Terrorism, Summer 2007, CITY J., 
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/17_3_ preventing_terrorism.html (quoting Los 
Angeles Police Department counterterrorism official who states: “The FBI has 12,000 agents 
for the entire country, only some of whom do counterterrorism.  Local and state law 
enforcement includes some 800,000 people who know their territory.  We are destined to be 
frontline soldiers in what could be a very long and complicated war.”). 
 41. See Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, NYPD, 
Prepared Statement of Testimony Before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://hsgac. 
senate.gov/public/_files/091206Falkenrath.pdf, at 3. 
 42. The FBI does not publish current figures on this, but in 2003 the number was 
about 1600.  See Statement of John MacGaffin to the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://www.9-11commission. 
gov/hearings/hearing6/witness_macgaffin.htm. 
 43. See Marc Sageman, A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists, 618 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 223 (2008). 
 44. See infra notes 115-116 and accompanying text. 
 45. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 85-93; DAVID H. BAYLEY, 
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such knowledge and networks of community relationships, local police can 
better cultivate informants and detect suspicious irregularities. 
While the decentralized structure of U.S. policing offers several 
advantages when it comes to combating terrorism, it also creates 
organizational challenges.  To begin with, that local police agencies 
command large numbers of personnel intimately familiar with their local 
communities makes them a valuable asset for fulfilling counterterrorism 
functions but creates an enormous complication in return.  How should 
these resources be coordinated across thousands of local agencies and with 
the federal government? 
Counterterrorism cooperation among police agencies requires 
horizontal and vertical coordination.  Horizontally, local police agencies 
need to communicate and collaborate with other local police agencies.  
Vertically, they need to communicate and collaborate with state and federal 
agencies.  Information must then flow along these axes.  Information about 
threats or investigative leads must radiate from the center (often through 
federal agencies such as the FBI or Department of Homeland Security) out 
to local agencies that can act on that information. Those local agencies at 
the periphery must direct information toward the center, where it can be 
acted upon immediately by the federal government or aggregated to help 
shape policy.46 
Besides informational coordination, which needs to be achieved quickly 
and often secretly, operations by law enforcement agencies (such as arrests 
and surveillance) need to be coordinated across multidimensional 
jurisdictional lines.47  The problem of how to link thousands of separate 
agencies together efficiently is not simply one of scale.  Heterogeneity  also 
magnifies the complexity.   
Local police jurisdictions differ greatly in features such as population 
size and density, ethnic composition, geography, urbanization, sitting of 
high-profile targets, civic culture, and political orientation.48  Local police 
forces vary in terms of size, resources, capability, operating procedures, 
equipment, and day-to-day priorities, not to mention variations in local 
laws, including those regulating police conduct.49 
In terms of size, for example, the 46 largest metropolitan police forces 
(out of a total of over 13,000 state and local forces) account for over a third 
 
POLICE FOR THE FUTURE 105-120 (1994). 
 46. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR INFORMATION SHARING 3 (2007), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/index.html. 
 47. For a discussion of these issues in the context of the Zazi case, discussed supra 
note 24 and in accompanying text, see Associated Press, NYPD Source’s Role Fuels 
Questions About Raids, Sept. 22, 2009. 
 48. For a description of contrasting approaches to counterterrorism policing in New 
York City and Los Angeles, see Miller, supra note 40. 
 49. See Shane Harris, Fusion Centers Raise a Fuss, NAT’L J.,(2007). 
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of all police officers nationwide, while there are also nearly 800 local police 
agencies that have just one officer.50  Consider also the unique threats that 
New York City faces, for example, as a densely populated, ethnically 
diverse home to much of the U.S. and global private financial system.51 
In countries with national police forces, such as France, the 
organizational challenge of coordinating local counterterrorism police 
efforts is eased through centralized and hierarchical command.52  Although 
the United Kingdom does not have a single national police force, its local 
police forces are linked to each other and to national counterterrorism 
efforts through standardized institutional mechanisms.  Each individual 
police force in the United Kingdom, for example, until recently had a 
special branch whose primary duties were to prosecute and assist in 
counterterrorism and counterintelligence operations.  Before recent reforms 
further centralized British counterterrorism policing,53 these units interacted 
directly with MI5 (the Security Service, which deals with domestic 
intelligence) and MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service, which deals with 
intelligence abroad).54 
The United States cannot rely on such formal hierarchical command or 
uniform institutional mechanisms to link together the country’s massive 
policing network.  The Constitution was designed so that the federal 
government may not directly control local law enforcement agencies.  In 
Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a federal 
statutory provision that required local law enforcement officials to assist in 
conducting background checks prior to issuance of gun permits.  The case 
clarifies that the federal government cannot “commandeer” local police 
forces into service,55 which means that it must use other tools to align the 
efforts of state and local police agencies with federal initiatives. 
These tools include information-sharing arrangements, financial grants, 
and training programs designed to help bolster and unify local capabilities.56  
 
 50. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 49. 
 51. For a detailed discussion of how the New York Police Department organizes for 
these counterterrorism challenges, see Prepared Statement of Testimony Before the S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of 
Richard A. Falkenrath, Deputy Comm’r for Counterterrorism, N.Y. Police Dept.), available 
at http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/091206Falkenrath.pdf; see also CHRISTOPHER 
DICKEY, SECURING THE CITY: INSIDE AMERICA’S BEST COUNTERTERROR FORCE – THE NYPD 
(2009). 
 52. See PETER CHALK & WILLIAM ROSENAU, CONFRONTING THE “ENEMY WITHIN”: 
SECURITY INTELLIGENCE, THE POLICE, AND COUNTERTERRORISM IN FOUR DEMOCRACIES 17-
23 (2004) 
 53. Hugh Muir, End of the Road for Special Branch, GUARDIAN, Sept. 9, 2005,  
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/sep/09/terrorism.ukcrime. 
 54. CHALK & ROSENAU, supra note 52, at 7-15. 
 55. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929, 933-935 (1997). 
 56. See Press Release, Dept. of Homeland Sec., DHS Announces Release of 
Application Guidance for Over $3 Billion in Grant Programs, Feb. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1201882070387.shtm. The Department of Justice’s 
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The U.S. policing system has dealt with similar challenges in confronting 
other law enforcement issues, such as narcotics trafficking and gang or 
organized crime activity, that have national and international dimensions, 
and require information sharing and coordination among federal and local 
police agencies.57 Counterterrorism, however, differs in size and 
complexity. 
The federal government has established several platforms for sharing 
terrorism-related information among local police forces and between local 
and federal agencies. The FBI has spearheaded the expansion over recent 
years of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) in local areas. Other federal, 
state, and local agencies have assigned officers to the JTTFs to help 
coordinate intelligence and law enforcement operations across bureaucratic 
lines.  In effect, the JTTFs allow the federal government to exert 
considerable control over any operations that run through them.  There were 
about three dozen such FBI-led task forces before September 11, 2001, 
compared with over 100 today.58 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act, as amended in 2007 by the 9/11 Commission Act, requires 
the President to take action to facilitate sharing of terrorism-related 
information among federal, state, and local entities.59 
The Department of Homeland Security funds state-operated “fusion 
centers” to synthesize law enforcement and investigative information. 
Unlike the JTTFs, which help manage operations of participating agencies, 
the fusion centers operate as information clearinghouses.  Similarly, the 
Justice Department has established new programs such as a National Data 
Exchange, to enable federal law enforcement and intelligence officials to 
 
State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training Program (SLATT) is an example of a federal 
training program.  The program provides “pre-incident terrorism awareness training to state, 
local, and tribal law enforcement” personnel. Press Release, Dept. of Justice, Fact Sheet: 
Supporting State and Local Government Law Enforcement Accomplishments 2001-2008, 
Nov. 10, 2008, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2008/psc 08-
993.htm. 
 57. See Kip Schlegel, Transnational Crime: Implications for Local Law Enforcement, 
16 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 365 (2000); TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME 29 (Peter 
Reuter & Carol Petrie eds., Committee on Law and Justice, National Research Center, 
1999).  As examples, the FBI manages Violent Gang Task Forces and the Drug Enforcement 
Agency manages Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, while the federal 
government has established information-sharing mechanisms among federal and local law 
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other types of crimes.  See, e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigations, Violent Gang Task 
Forces, available at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cid/ngic/natgangfs.htm; Drug Enforcement 
Agency, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/ocdetf.htm. 
 58. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY (2007), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf. 
 59. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 
§1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-3670 (2004) (amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, §504, 121 Stat. 
266, 313-17 (2007)). 
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examine quickly huge quantities of state and local public records.60 The FBI 
recently launched a new system for sharing tips about possible terror threats 
with local police agencies.61 
The idea behind these programs is to build “an information sharing 
framework that supports an effective and efficient two-way flow of 
information enabling officials at all levels of government to counter and 
respond to threats.”62  The problem is not merely to collect and pass on 
more informational “dots,” but to make sense of them in ways that can be 
acted on effectively.  Indeed, the more “dots” that are collected, the harder 
it may be to analyze and prioritize them. 
It remains to be seen how effective these information networking 
efforts will be.  They are not yet fully developed; technology continues to 
change rapidly; and reliable data on their use are sparse.  Some dangers are 
evident already, however. 
First, the expansion of an information-sharing network magnifies some 
privacy risks, especially personal information collected in one locale is 
distributed more widely and to other levels of government.63  In some 
jurisdictions, civil liberties advocates have complained about the lack of 
adequate mechanisms to regulate government information-fusion activities, 
and this has sometimes helped to prompt oversight reforms.64 
 
 60. Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Ellen Nakashima, National Dragnet Is a Click Away, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2008, at A1.  The National Data Exchange has been used since March 
2008, but will not become fully operational and deployed until 2010. See Posting of Michael 
Cooney to Layer 8 Blog, FBI Turns on National Crime Information Sharing System, 
available at http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/27127. 
 61. See Devlin Barrett, FBI Shares Threat-Tips with Local Police Agencies, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 14, 2009; see also Eric Schmitt, Surveillance Effort Draws Civil 
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police departments and other law enforcement agencies across the country are embracing a 
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 62. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 46.  Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano recently 
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government is a critical part of improving our partnerships.”  The Path Forward, supra note 
3. 
 63. See Barrett, supra note 61. 
 64. Jason Hancock, Iowa’s Intelligence Fusion Center ‘Connects the Dots,’ IOWA 
INDEP., July 29, 2008, http://iowaindependent.com/2983/iowas-intelligence-fusion-center-
connects-the-dots; see also William Petroski, Intelligence Centers’ Growth Concerns Civil 
Libertarians, DES MOINES REG., May 26, 2009, available at http://www.desmoinesregister. 
com/article/20090526/NEWS10/905260381/-1/SPORTS09; Mary Beth Sheridan, States 
Setting up Own Antiterror Centers: Privacy Issues Raised as Data Are Collected, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 1, 2007 available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/ 
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Information-sharing also carries security risks. For example, 
information about threats or ongoing investigations that the federal 
government hopes to keep quiet are more likely to surface publicly as more 
agencies have access to that information.65  Indeed, political pressures on 
local police, described below, may make them more likely than federal 
police to broadcast or leak sensitive public safety information. 
An efficient and effective network also requires some degree of 
standardization across the thousands of police agencies at all levels.  But 
standardization itself is difficult to achieve when the police forces 
themselves vary in size, capability, sophistication, and in the threats their 
jurisdictions face, especially when the federal government lacks authority to 
dictate reform at the local level. 
Even if uniform approaches could be imposed by the federal 
government through indirect means, too much standardization might 
undermine the advantages of experimentation and tailoring to conditions 
that come with local autonomy.  Or, as the next section explores, excessive 
standardization might disrupt systems of local accountability. 
III.  ACCOUNTABILITY CHALLENGES 
“It has long been accepted,” according to one major treatise on the 
police powers of the state, “that the best way to maintain the accountability 
of the police is to keep the lines between the local community and the 
police department as short as possible.”66 “The main consequence of 
America’s decentralized [criminal justice] system,” observes James Q. 
Wilson, “is that public opinion closely watches and deeply influences law 
enforcement.”67 
Maintaining police accountability through local public and political 
control is relatively straightforward when local police are focused 
exclusively on their traditional functions of preventing crime, maintaining 
order, and providing services.  Combating terrorism and other threats to the 
nation with intrusive powers, however, exerts pulls on local policing that 
strain these systems and patterns of political accountability. 
 
 65. See Theo Milonopoulos, Local Officials Ask for Help in Terrorism Fight, L.A. 
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at 13 (describing federal security clearance procedures as a barrier to 
greater federal, state, and local counterterrorism information-sharing).  On recent 
intelligence information-collection reforms, see Press Release, ACLU, Intelligence 
Community Raises Its Standards for Information Collection: Collaborative Effort Addresses 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Concerns, May 22, 2009, available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
safefree/general/39656prs20090522.html. 
 66. See JOHN D. BREWER ET AL., THE POLICE, PUBLIC ORDER AND THE STATE 115 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 67. Wilson, supra note 9, at 476.  See generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and 
Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699 (2005) (discussing the relationship between various 
understandings of democracy and policing in the United States). 
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Most police agencies are locally financed and controlled, and are 
subject to direction and oversight by officials elected by and responsible to 
the communities they serve.68  Many municipal police chiefs, for example, 
are appointed by elected mayors. County sheriffs are often elected directly. 
State governments may provide some financial and other resources to local 
police agencies, but critical budgetary allocation decisions are made by 
local governments themselves.  Local police officers are generally drawn 
from the community they will serve, and they are mostly trained there as 
well. 
These long-standing features of U.S. policing – reflecting historical 
distrust of central government as well as some efficiency and practical 
advantages – have made the system highly resistant to calls for 
centralization or consolidation.69 
The notion that local police agencies are accountable to their own 
communities and responsive to local needs and preferences has never meant 
that they are free to ignore national priorities, nor is significant federal 
direction of local police new.  Beginning in the 1960s, the federal 
government launched a series of initiatives – usually through grants – to 
gain state and local law enforcement agencies’ support in waging the wars 
on crime and drugs.  For instance, the Local Law Enforcement Assistance 
(LLEA) program provided federal money to states in support of narcotics 
enforcement efforts, and the Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS) program provided federal money directly to municipal police 
departments to support violent-criminal enforcement efforts.70 
The result has been a delicate balance for police agencies between local 
autonomy and participation in a broader federal system and constraint by 
law.  As Herman Goldstein explains: 
The police should not be responsive in an unlimited sense to either 
the entire community or minority interests in the community.  In 
many situations it is essential that the police act independent of 
local community interests, responding instead to state or federal 
laws that preempt local legislation and override local preferences.  
It is precisely because we require a system that will insulate the 
police from some pressures while subjecting them to others that the 
 
 68. See id. 
 69. See BREWER ET AL, supra note 66, at 115; NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra 
note 10, at 51. 
 70. In March 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced the revitalization of the 
Office of COPS and a $1 billion COPS Hiring Recovery Program, through which the 
Department of Justice would provide funding directly to local law enforcement agencies to 
hire new law enforcement officers.  Holder stated that this program was needed in part 
because “our cities are, in a very real sense, on the front lines in our fight against terrorism.” 
Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Attorney General Eric Holder 
at the National League of Cities Conference, Mar. 16, 2009, available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-090316.html. 
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task of achieving a proper form of citizen control over the police is 
so complex.71 
Like the organizational challenges discussed above, accountability 
challenges are neither new nor unique to the national security context. They 
are, however, magnified in the context of combating terrorism. 
One distinction between the many prior federal grant programs and 
recent federal initiatives to enlist local support in defending against national 
security threats is that the former involved “federalizing” spheres of activity 
traditionally controlled by the states (crime), whereas the latter involve 
“localizing” traditional federal spheres (national security).  The very term 
“national security” seems in some sense inconsistent with a police system 
built upon strong traditions of localism.  Yet any time national security 
threats emanate from within U.S. borders – but especially as globalization 
of travel and communications expands – events in any local area may have 
national or international security repercussions. 
One might think of the supply of police functions in market terms.  
Control over police priorities and conduct by the local community – 
through police leadership elections or appointments by elected officials and 
through scrutiny by the local press – helps ensure that supply of police 
services is responsive to community demand.72  A key issue is then whether 
federal government influence on that prioritization of police activities in 
support of national objectives is market-correcting or market-distorting. 
Federal government intervention may be needed – but may also be 
viewed as distorting – because unlike most (though not all) crime 
prevention, the costs of combating terrorism are often borne locally while 
the benefits accrue elsewhere or are not even observable.  In the case of 
most ordinary crime, the harm of the outlawed activity is felt by the 
community in which it takes place, as is the impact of combating crime, 
thereby allowing the community to weigh those costs and benefits.73 
Terrorist activities, however, are usually dispersed, and the ultimate 
attacks may occur far away from the site of their planning – perhaps not 
even in the same country.74  The costs of combating terrorism – resource 
costs and trade-offs, intrusions on privacy or inconveniences of security 
precautions – are nonetheless felt locally.75 
 
 71. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 143. 
 72. This is not to say that this system always works well and produces effective and 
legitimate outcomes. For a critical analysis of community policing and democratic 
accountability, see Sklansky, supra note 67, at 1810-1814. 
 73. See Wilson, supra note 9. 
 74. David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635, 
637-638 (2005).  To be clear, this issue is not entirely unique to terrorism or national 
security threats. It also applies, for example, to narcotics activities and organized crime. 
  75. See id. 
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Even when perceived threats to national security arise, citizens will still 
demand from their local police the same public safety and services to which 
the community is accustomed.76  There is a limit, therefore, to the resources 
or mission trade-offs that local agencies can devote to national security 
functions.  The federal government, by contrast, will be held accountable 
for security lapses wherever they occur, by nature of its constitutional 
primacy in national security affairs and corresponding public expectations. 
At the same time, federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI 
have the luxury of some discretion and electivity in their policing priorities. 
They can move agents from fighting other crimes to concentrating on 
counterterrorism, for example, more readily than local agencies can because 
after September 11, public expectations are more focused on federal law 
enforcement’s national security roles and because federal agencies are more 
insulated from short-term electoral accountability.77 
In general, this means that federal coordination efforts and offers of 
assistance to state and local agencies can alter local police priorities from 
what the local political “market” might produce, but only to a point.  A key 
question is what happens when federal national security priorities are too 
greatly misaligned from local political preferences. 
Some of the consequences of misalignment are illustrated in two 
frequently cited examples of local-federal tension in combating terrorism: 
Detroit’s response to federal requests to interview certain immigrants, and 
Portland, Oregon’s withdrawal from the FBI’s regional JTTF. 
In November 2001, the Justice Department requested that local police 
departments assist in interviewing 5,000 foreign men of Middle Eastern 
origin residing in their communities to determine whether any of them 
posed a terrorist threat or had useful information about possible terrorists. 
The Detroit Police Chief and local officials worried that these interviews 
might violate of state law and could alienate Arab-Americans.  They 
therefore refused to participate in the federal initiative.78 
In 2005, Portland became the first city to remove its law enforcement 
agencies from the FBI-led JTTF.  Key members of the city government 
worried that the JTTF’s surveillance activities might, while complying with 
federal law, not meet more stringent state law standards despite FBI 
assurances.  Nor, due to secrecy rules, could city government leaders 
 
 76. Ellen Scrivner, The Impact of September 11th on Community Policing, in 
COMMUNITY POLICING: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 183, 187 (Lorie Fridell & Mary 
Ann Wycoff eds., 2004). 
 77. Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 
CRIME & JUST. 377, 407-426 (2006). 
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oversee whether city police officers participating in the JTTF were abiding 
by agreed-upon guidelines.79  
In both Detroit and Portland, pressures stemming from local 
accountability systems forced municipal agencies to opt out of the federal 
effort.80  The Detroit greater metropolitan area is home to an especially 
large Arab-American community.  Arab-American leaders voiced concern 
about the interview initiative, and the local police had worked hard over 
recent years to build a relationship of trust with the Arab-American 
community, a relationship the police feared could fray as a result of heavy-
handed federal efforts.81  Portland, is an area known for its generally liberal 
orientation (in 2003 the city council publicly criticized and called for major 
changes in the USA PATRIOT Act, enacted by Congress soon after 
September 11 to expand domestic law enforcement and intelligence 
powers), and city officials were probably particularly sensitive about 
aggressive federal counterterrorism efforts after a Portland-area lawyer and 
convert to Islam was erroneously linked by the FBI to terrorist bombings in 
Madrid.82 
These examples are best seen as extremes rather than as illustrations of 
the norm.  Most local police agencies have cooperated with federal efforts 
in large measure.  However, these counter-examples are important to show 
what happens when national security policing initiatives get too far out of 
step with local political constraints.  One may infer that many other local 
communities and institutions will also resist, even if in less radical ways.83  
An important debate centers on whether local accountability systems can 
withstand federal pressure and influence. 
Daniel Richman argues that over time the political process through 
which federal, state, and local governments negotiate cooperation in joint 
efforts may promote both accountability and effectiveness in combating 
terrorism.84  That national security efforts, led principally by the federal 
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government, depend on local agencies gives those local agencies leverage.  
Their accountability, through both electoral politics and the need to 
maintain cooperative relationships with the communities they serve, in turn 
may help tether the combined local-state-federal government to responsible 
and effective policies. 
William Stuntz offers a less sanguine view.  He views the threat of 
terrorism as likely to loosen restraints on coercive federal police powers, 
which will likely loosen restraints on police powers at the local level.85  
Corey Robin similarly points to the history of police excesses in the 1950s 
and 1960s in warning that “[t]he danger of cooperation between federal 
agencies and local police is not that the former will conscript the latter into 
repressive programs the latter would not otherwise pursue, but that it allows 
the police to apply the legitimizing gloss of national security to their own 
pet projects of repression.”86 
As Richman points out, the notion of local police governance serving as 
a brake to local-federal cooperation on overly aggressive federal tendencies 
is ironic, given the past tendencies to view federal oversight as necessary to 
rein in abusive state and local practices rather than the reverse.87  Indeed, 
much of modern constitutional criminal procedure doctrine grew out of 
federal clampdowns on abuses at the state and local levels (often tinged 
with institutional racism).88 
In the end, the degree to which federally led national security initiatives 
distort – for better or for worse – local accountability systems, or the extent 
to which those local accountability systems shape broader national security 
policy will probably vary from locality to locality, depending on many of 
the factors cited earlier,  including size, ethnic composition, and 
dependence on federal assistance. 
This push and pull dynamic involving federal and local pressures is 
hardly unique to policing.  There is often, however, an added complication 
in the national security realm because many policing activities aimed at 
combating terrorism or other national security threats are necessarily secret 
or opaque to the public.89  The ability to track crime rates and to compare 
them across both localities and time helps hold local police and other law 
enforcement agencies accountable for performance, at least with regard to 
their main law and order functions.  The public can gauge performance and 
express satisfaction or dissatisfaction through the political process.90  But 
secret surveillance practices – such as the use of undercover informants or 
 
 85. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137 
(2002); Herman, supra note 79, at 968. 
 86. See Corey Robin, History’s Shadow, BOSTON REV., Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 20. 
 87. See Richman, supra note 77, at 421. 
 88. See Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural 
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 197, 201-206. 
 89. See Ross, supra note 33. 
 90. See Richman, supra note 77, at 378. 
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remote monitoring – are designed to be undetectable.91  Even if such 
surveillance is generally believed to be occurring, its impact on security or 
liberty is difficult to observe or measure.92 
This secrecy challenge for accountability is not new, and it exists at all 
levels of government.  But a robust system of formal and informal checks 
on secretive state activity generally operates differently – and in some cases 
more strongly – at the federal level than at the local level.93  It may seem 
counterintuitive to worry more about the adequacy of checks at the state 
and local level, because federal agencies command such vast intrusive 
capabilities and have historically abused them.  But that history of 
problems, especially in the 1960s and 1970s, led to the creation of formal 
mechanisms and institutions at the federal level to regulate domestic spying 
by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. 
Following the Church and Pike Committee investigations in the 1970s, 
Congress enacted legislation, such as the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA), and created permanent congressional intelligence oversight 
committees and intelligence agency inspectors general.  Internal federal 
regulations and guidelines constructed a “wall” separating intelligence and 
law enforcement bureaucracies and the information they collected.94  The 
abuses of the 1960s and 1970s led also to constraints on domestic spying at 
the state and local levels, including the enactment of state laws restricting 
surveillance of political and other group activities as well as consent 
decrees stemming from lawsuits challenging police monitoring.95 
Since September 11, many of these post-Watergate reforms have been 
rolled back.  At the federal level, for example, the USA PATRIOT Act and 
administrative reforms have expanded law enforcement agencies’ authority 
to collect intelligence domestically and to share that information with other 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies.96 At state and local levels, too, 
some governments have sought to expand their surveillance authority, 
including through legislative reform97 and revisions to consent decrees.98 
 
 91. Criminal law enforcement also uses these tools, but in that context they are heavily 
and publicly regulated, and the general policies of their use – even if not specific instances – 
are openly known. 
 92. See Nathan Alexander Sales, Secrecy and National Security Investigations, 58 
ALA. L. REV. 811, 829-831 (2007). 
 93. For a general discussion of these issues as they relate to federal intelligence 
activities, see JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR 
PERILOUS TIMES 126-159 (2007). 
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 95. See Paul G. Chevigny, Politics and Law in the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1984). 
 96. See William C. Banks, The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209 (2007). 
 97. See Charles H. Kennedy & Peter P. Swire, State Wiretaps and Electronic 
Surveillance After September 11, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 977 (2003) (“Not surprisingly, we 
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At the federal level, however, there generally remain multiple layers of 
checks on the conduct of police and intelligence agencies, and perceived 
excesses by the Bush administration have intensified that scrutiny, 
including that by the courts.99  Congressional committees and the Justice 
Department’s inspector general’s office actively oversee the FBI’s activities 
and have debated fiercely further amendments to domestic intelligence 
laws.100  Beyond government institutional safeguards, scrutiny by civil 
liberties groups and investigative journalists provide further checks on 
executive discretion, including through litigation.101 
Of course there are exceptions and reasons that in some cases scrutiny 
may be more robust at the state and local levels than at the federal level.102  
For example, state and local governments lack formal authorities for 
designating and maintaining classified information such as those the federal 
government uses, which help keep information from the public domain.103  
Other mechanisms for promoting local police compliance with 
constitutional and other legal rules include criminal and civil liability, 
internal inspections, and citizen oversight boards.104  One important 
question, though, is whether at the state and local levels there are sufficient 
checks on secret activities, because some layers of inter-branch or non-
governmental  monitoring are likely to be weaker and less formalized at 
state and local levels, or in some locales, than at the federal level.105 At the 
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FBI Handled “National Security Letters,” see Oversight Results: The FBI Tightens Its 
Procedures for Using National Security Letters, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2008, at A18. 
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and local police are accustomed to keeping secret operational information. 
 104. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL , supra note 10, at 275-290. 
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Oversight of state and local intelligence activities is mostly ad hoc and informal. It 
is generally conducted through the LLEA’s chain of command, although some 
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state and local activities. That may be in large part because most intelligence 
gathering – especially that not predicated on a crime having been committed – is 
done by federal officials through federal authorizations.   
Id. at 49. 
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very least, it is likely that oversight will remain highly uneven across 
different states and localities, depending on variation in institutional 
mechanisms, civic culture, and the strength of local watchdog and advocacy 
groups or branches.106 
While state and local agencies lack the resources and technical 
capabilities of the federal government (as well as the intensity of national 
security political pressures), there are other reasons to be especially vigilant 
concerning national security-driven infringements of civil liberties at the 
local level.  Because local police, unlike the FBI, have a broader law and 
order and public service mandate, their routine activities tend to penetrate 
more widely and deeply into community groups, including civic and 
religious organizations.  Indeed, this is one of the features that make local 
police potentially valuable from a counterterrorism perspective. 
Consider, for example, a law enforcement officer visiting a local 
mosque believed to provide a forum for the preaching of extremism.  
Putting aside how the local law or internal regulations regulate surveillance 
of groups, a local uniformed police officer’s visit to that mosque and 
interaction with its congregation might stir fewer anxieties among its 
members than a visit by an FBI agent.107  Police are supposed to interact 
with significant community groups and to understand the relationships 
within the community, while FBI agents historically were not expected to. 
In some cases, this may be a benign police-community relationship from a 
civil liberties standpoint; in other cases it may open the door to abuses. 
IV.  FUNCTIONAL CHALLENGES 
The example of conducting interviews of those attending a mosque 
highlights another set of challenges for local police in handling national 
security mandates – there is tension between intelligence functions and 
other police functions.  The Detroit Police Department’s resistance to 
federal immigration enforcement and investigation efforts discussed above 
reflected not only the political independence of states and localities,108 but 
also the practical difficulties of effectively carrying out traditional policing 
 
 106. See Wesley G. Skogan & Tracey L. Meares, Lawful Policing, ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
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effectiveness of various approaches to promoting police compliance with law and 
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targeting mosque members); Samantha Henry, Some Muslims Rethink Close Ties to Law 
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missions while simultaneously collecting national security information 
concerning community groups and their members.109 
This is more than simply an issue of constrained resources and 
allocation trade-offs (although, of course, those are involved).110  Rather, 
this is about whether and how pursuit of national security missions can 
undermine other law enforcement and community safety functions. 
There are two main difficulties.  The first is the general and long-
standing tension between criminal law enforcement and intelligence 
collection.  Law enforcement agencies typically strive for convictions of 
lawbreakers, while intelligence agencies attempt to collect information 
about them.111  Law enforcement involves taking individuals off the street; 
intelligence agencies may depend on keeping them on the street.112  Often, 
of course, the objectives align, but not always. 
While this tension has been studied mostly at the federal level,113 it also 
complicates the organizational challenges mentioned earlier.  Local police 
agencies may be more likely to prize efforts to rid their streets of dangerous 
individuals even if doing so is at the expense of developing clear pictures of 
national or international networks, a federal priority. 
Consider, for example, the varying priorities a local police agency and 
the FBI might have when it comes to arresting an individual suspected of 
trafficking in bomb-making materials.  The local police agency might want 
to arrest this individual as soon as possible and in a high-profile way.  By 
contrast, the FBI (with responsibility for federal crimes as well as domestic 
intelligence) might not want to disrupt his activities immediately or at all, 
but rather would prefer instead to build a larger case against his affiliates in 
other jurisdictions or to collect intelligence on a broader network.114 
 
 109. See Harris, supra note 27, at 37-44. 
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 111. See William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret Surveillance 
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How should these concerns be reconciled and prioritized?  The JTTFs 
provide a mechanism for adjudicating bureaucratic differences – and 
ultimately the prosecutions of terrorism crimes will usually take place at the 
federal level – but they do not set the underlying policy priorities, which 
need to be worked out through the political process. 
Besides the general tension between law enforcement and intelligence 
functions, a further tension concerns balancing counterterrorism activities 
with the particular law and order activities of local police agencies, 
especially where aggressive counterterrorism may undermine cooperative 
relationships with community actors. 
As noted earlier, current trends in community policing and problem-
oriented policing demand wider and deeper police engagement within the 
community, including cooperative partnerships with community 
organizations and leaders to reduce crime, enhance security, and tackle the 
problems that underlie criminal patterns.115  These approaches often include 
involving key community groups or representatives in decision making as 
part of a broader effort to improve responsiveness to community needs and 
establish sustained relationships of trust.116 
Some see this trend as creating natural synergies with national security 
functions.117  Gary LaFree and James Hendrickson of the University of 
Maryland write: “In many ways the community-oriented approach favored 
by successful police departments is the same kind of approach that is most 
likely to uncover terrorist operations.”118  Local familiarity provides a 
baseline for detecting suspicious activities, and local police may have 
networks of cooperative relationships with community members who 
supply them with information.119  According to George L. Kelling and 
William J. Bratton, Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department (which 
commands the second largest U.S. municipal counterterrorism police force, 
behind New York): “Local police officers have an everyday presence in the 
communities that they are sworn to protect.  They ‘walk the beat,’ 
communicate regularly with local residents and business owners, and are 
more likely to notice even subtle changes in the neighborhoods that they 
patrol.”120 As a result, local police “are in a better position to know 
 
 115. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 10, at 85-93. There remains a good 
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responsible leaders in the Islamic and Arabic communities and can reach 
out to them for information or for help in developing informants.”121 
Ellen Scrivner, the former Deputy Director for Community Policing 
Development in the Justice Department’s Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, offers a more cautious assessment.122  She suggests that 
some of the local police agency enthusiasm for taking on counterterrorism 
functions may reflect the pursuit of new financial and other resources and 
may come at the expense of traditional local police functions: 
During the 1990s, law enforcement leaders helped to determine 
how resources should be directed to continue the fight against 
crime, and they had a strong voice at the federal funding table.  
Now they struggle to find where the table is located . . . .  
Consequently, police leaders question whether law enforcement 
interests will be fully represented in what is now a competition for 
resources.  These events cannot help but influence the future of 
community policing as local agencies modify operations to position 
their agencies to receive homeland security funds.123 
Some of this concern is based on the fear that resource-tradeoffs will 
cause counterterrorism activities to squeeze out other police functions.124  
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that aggressive counterterrorism policies 
by law enforcement agencies may disrupt other valuable policing 
efforts.  In particular, perceptions that police are “spying” may undermine 
the relationships of trust so critical to community policing strategies.125  The 
Los Angeles Police Department recently touted its program for ensuring 
that tips about potential terrorist activity are passed from patrolling officers 
to federal security officials, but it then had to shelve a program intended to 
reach out to Muslim communities because it was perceived as an effort to 
monitor them.126  The urgency of taking short-term aggressive police action 
to uncover or disrupt terrorist plots may also erode goodwill cultivated 
through long-term police efforts to provide community services.127 
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These functional tensions are likely to be exacerbated across federal-
local jurisdictional and bureaucratic lines, because federal law enforcement 
agencies generally do not have to balance local law and order with their 
national security priorities, have less direct interest in long-term 
relationships with community figures and groups, and are not directly 
accountable to them politically.128 A study sponsored by the Justice 
Department’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services reported 
concerns among local police that federal agents “are not aware of 
community issues when they sweep into a jurisdiction to search for an 
individual or engage in other investigatory practices and leave just as 
quickly.  The unintended consequence is damage to police-citizen relations, 
particularly in minority communities, that took tremendous effort to build 
through community policing.”129 
If Daniel Richman is correct, in suggesting that “the federal 
government [may] court the assistance of state and local governments by 
giving them a greater voice in how the federal government interacts with 
citizens, and particularly with immigrant communities,”130 we can expect 
some of these functional tensions to work themselves out through federal-
local political and bureaucratic dynamics.  David Thacher studied the 
handling of the Justice Department’s immigrant interview requests by the 
police department in Dearborn, Michigan, near Detroit, a city that contains 
a high concentration of Arab-Americans.  He found that: 
Concerns about community trust did seem to influence the way the 
city participated in the interviews, despite the police’s own 
inclination to view the effort as a legitimate law enforcement tool.  
Local police declined to conduct the interviews themselves, they 
went to great lengths to explain their participation in a qualified 
way, and they ultimately adopted the role (at least in part) of 





In that way, the role the [Dearborn Police Department] played in 
the Justice Department interviews was shaped by the interest local 
police had in establishing legitimate boundaries around the use of 
new surveillance and information-gathering efforts, which could 
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otherwise undermine the trust and support they had worked so hard 
to develop in the Arab community.132 
It is difficult to generalize from cases such as this. At the federal level, 
too, the FBI and other agencies and departments have taken steps to reach 
out to Arab-American and Muslim-American communities, perhaps partly 
as a result of interactions with local law enforcement agencies.133  The 
degree to which any gap between counterterrorism functions and successful 
local policing approaches can be narrowed in the long term will depend 
heavily on whether local policing is seen by security officials at all levels as 
effective in guaranteeing both local and national security. 
Looking at the British experience, Martin Innes concludes: “Based 
upon providing local communities with a degree of direct democratic 
influence over how they are policed, [neighborhood policing] officers will 
be well positioned to build levels of interpersonal trust with members of 
Muslim and other minority communities upon which the communication of 
intelligence is often contingent.”134  In addition to addressing the 
improvement of counterterrorism effectiveness without the sacrifice of 
other police missions, Innes concludes that this model helps safeguard civil 
liberties, too: “[Integrating neighborhood policing into counterterrorism 
efforts] may be more effective and ultimately less damaging to democratic 
traditions than extending covert policing methods and the sorts of 
reactionary legislative reform proposals that governments tend to issue in 
the wake of major terrorist incidents.”135  This view heavily influences 
counterterrorism strategies in the United Kingdom, learned not only from 
dealing with contemporary Islamist terrorism but with Britain’s extended 
experience in combating terrorism in Northern Ireland.136   
Will a similar view take hold in the United States?  Perhaps, but, as 
discussed below, even if it would be desirable, any similar adaptation in the 
U.S. system will likely be slow and nonlinear due to the institutional 
fragmentation and decentralization of the American policing system. 
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V.  FUTURE PATHS 
The legal and institutional challenges discussed above stem from the 
localized and heterogeneous nature of the U.S. local policing system.  One 
possible future involves radical structural reform that would address these 
issues through new federal institutions to coordinate efforts nationally and 
relieve local police systems of major responsibilities.  At the other end of 
the spectrum, decentralized localization of American policing might not 
only prove resilient, but could gain new strength from the national security 
law challenges discussed above. 
As for radical structural change, some experts after the September 2001 
attacks called for creating a domestic intelligence agency like the United 
Kingdom’s MI5 to relieve local police of much of its national security 
mission.137  Creating new federal institutions, so the argument goes, might 
also alleviate tension within the FBI between its law enforcement and its 
intelligence functions, and it might even address some civil liberties 
concerns by separating the most intrusive surveillance authorities from 
institutions that wield other coercive powers, such as authority to arrest.138 
Such architectural revamping – even if it could address the fundamental 
decentralization problem – is extremely unlikely, however.  Serious 
proposals of this sort have waned in recent years, as 2001 has become more 
distant.139  The political convulsions following the 9/11 attacks produced a 
series of macro-level architectural reforms and decisions, including 
assignment of domestic counterterrorism intelligence collection to the FBI, 
reorganization of the intelligence community under a new Director of 
National Intelligence, and creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security, which consolidating dozens of smaller agencies.140  Even putting 
aside the civil liberties outcry that would follow any proposal to create a 
dedicated domestic intelligence service, it seems unlikely that additional 
organizational overhauls will follow in the near future absent a dramatic 
escalation in threat.   
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implement domestic intelligence gathering into its mission, resuscitating the debate about 
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The process of further organizational reform in the foreseeable future is 
therefore likely to be evolutionary, not revolutionary.  The challenges 
outlined above will be addressed incrementally.  Drawing broad 
conclusions about how these challenges will be resolved, however, is 
complicated by two factors. 
First, the very structure of American policing that makes these 
questions so critical – decentralized and heterogeneous – makes it arduous 
but necessary to study these national security institutional challenges 
empirically in a thorough way.  American policing at all levels has been 
well studied, but much of what we know about recent experience with 
national security coordination, accountability, and tensions with other 
police functions is based more on anecdotal evidence than on the type 
comprehensive investigation that will support the needed analytical depth.  
For example, the point raised in Part IV about different checks operating on 
some national security powers at the federal level compared to state and 
local levels warrants further study.  Future studies might help explain why 
there is – or why there should be – differentiation between national security 
functions of local and national agencies. 
Second, the national security threat itself is evolving.141 There is a 
growing debate within the academic and intelligence communities about 
whether the primary terrorism threat to the United States comes from 
abroad by centrally organized and controlled groups like al Qaeda, or is 
home-grown in the United States from loosely knit cells of individuals 
becoming radicalized largely on their own.142  According to terrorism 
researcher Marc Sageman (who has worked as an advisor to the NYPD): 
The present threat has evolved from a structured group of al Qaeda 
masterminds, controlling vast resources and issuing commands, to a 
multitude of informal local groups trying to emulate their 
predecessors by conceiving and executing operations from the 
bottom up. These “homegrown” wannabes form a scattered global 
network, a leaderless jihad.143  
Other scholars, such as Bruce Hoffman, dispute Sageman’s assessment, and 
argue instead that al Qaeda and its allies operating abroad remain strong and 
continue to constitute the major terrorism threat facing the United States.144  
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The U.S. intelligence community, meanwhile, maintains that al Qaeda and its 
allies continue to threaten the United States, while also predicting that 
autonomous terrorist cells will likely develop inside the United States.145 
Over the long term, responsibility for dealing with “top down” threats like 
al Qaeda will fall mostly on the federal government, which must penetrate and 
disrupt the network at home and abroad.  Responsibility for dealing with a 
“bottom up” threat like autonomous terrorist cells, by contrast, will continue to 
be shared heavily with local police agencies.146  According to Brian Michael 
Jenkins of the RAND Corporation, “As [terrorism] metastasizes, cops are it.  
We’re going to win this at the local level.”147  This would exacerbate the 
challenges outlined above.  Analyzing and designing institutions to address the 
organizational, accountability, and functional issues described above thus 
requires more precise efforts to match institutional solutions to sophisticated 
assessments of threat. 
CONCLUSION 
This article raises and begins to answer three key questions about the 
decentralized and heterogeneous system of U.S. policing and national 
security.  Is greater networking of local, state, and federal police agencies 
an effective way to combat terrorism?  Will devolution of national security 
responsibilities to local police agencies disrupt systems of accountability 
and oversight?  Will national security responsibilities undermine traditional 
core functions of local policing? 
The decentralization and heterogeneity of U.S. policing pose obstacles 
to effective national coordination efforts and sometimes serve to check 
intrusive federal powers and policies while also raising concerns about 
over-intrusion at the local level. Due to the vast diversity of U.S. 
communities and the police institutions that serve them, the equilibrium of 
national security law will reemerge, depending in part on the changing 
nature of the terrorism threat, in decentralized ways as well. 
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